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EXEXUTIVE SUMMARY
In early March 2003, USTRANSCOM asked personnel fiom the 31 lth Human Systems Wing (3 1 1 HSW) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to quickly evaluate a system proposed to be used for air transport of biologically contaminated human remains. The evaluation was intended to demonstrate whether the proposed system would effectively satisfy requirements established by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for importation of contaminated remains, namely a "hermetically sealed" triple containment system. The proposed system was evaluated under simulated flight conditions fiom 11 to 13 March 2003.
The proposed triple containment system consisted of BioSealB material, sealed inside a Ziegle* case, sealed in turn inside a BatesvilleQ casket, all commercial products. We modified a version of a protocol draft provided by the Mortuary Affairs community. The goal was to determine whether the triple containment system would maintain the three "hermetic" seals required by the CDC throughout typical air transport scenarios. The protocol was not designed to evaluate every conceivable contingency, specific material characteristics, or alternatives should the proposed system fail.
Materials were provided by Army G4 Field Services. Mortuary Affairs personnel participated and advised the testing staff on the use of materials. The system components were tested individually and together where feasible. The primary test parameter was exposure to pressure differentials as would be experienced in flight, including rapid decompression at cruise altitude. Materials were sealed at ambient altitude, about 400 feet above sea level. We attempted to simulate human remains as much as possible by using water filled balloons, but no attempt was made to quantify the starting gas volume sealed within a component.
The BioSealB held a seal that survived exposure to 47,000 feet. On one test the BioSealB developed a rupture during a rapid decompression, but on another test a BioSealB pouch did not rupture even at 86,000 feet, indicating a very strong material able to wibtand significant stress. We intentionally introduced contaminant materials within the seal of several pouches, such as sand, grass, and human hair, these pouches developed leaks at lower altitudes. It was observed that the integrity of the hand-sealed edges could vary due to operator performance characteristics, such as allowing the heat sealing unit to slip too quickly across the surface, allowing the material to bunch up, or allowing foreign matter on the surfaces to be sealed.
Direct observation of the construction of the Ziegle* case revealed areas that were not able to seal. We attempted to induce a pressure differential within a sealed case but were unable to achieve any differential at all. The case therefore was unable to achieve a hermetic seal even at ambient pressure.
The casket was not designed to maintain a hermetic seal while undergoing pressure changes of flight and is fitted with screw-top ports that the manufacturer's instructions stated should be opened during flight. The casket therefore would not be able to provide a hermetic seal during air transport.
...
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In summary, the testing team found that the BioSealO material would probably provide a hermetic seal, the Z i e g l d case would not, and the casket would not during flight but could reasonably be expected to during surface transport. The proposed triple containment system should not be used for air transport of biologically contaminated human remains.
INTRODUCTION
In early March 2003, USTRANSCOM asked personnel from the 3 1 1' Human Systems Wing (3 1 1 HSW) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to quickly evaluate a system proposed to be used for air transport of biologically contaminated human remains. The evaluation was intended to demonstrate whether the proposed system would effectively satisfy requirements established by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for importation of contaminated remains, namely a 6%ermetically sealed" triple containment system as described and recommended by the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board (ref 1). The proposed system was evaluated under simulated flight conditions, fiom 1 The proposed triple containment system consisted of remains sealed within BioSealB, sealed inside a Z i e g l d case, sealed in turn inside a Batesvilld casket, all commercial products. The human remains within the BioSealB bag was to be enclosed in a standard Human Remains Pouch (HRP), which is a sturdy bag with a zipper closure. However, the H W is not considered a component of the triple containment system. Given the short turn-around requested by TRANSCOM, an expedient testing protocol was developed, modified from a draft version of a protocol written by the Mortuary Affairs community. The goal was to determine whether the triple containment system would maintain the three "hermetic" seals required by the CDC throughout typical air transport scenarios. We used modified C-14 1 and C-17 flight profiles and included a step of exposure to heat (simulating a flight line) and a vibration table set to simulate transport aircraft. The protocol was not designed to evaluate every conceivable contingency, specific material characteristics, or alternatives should the proposed system fail.
Materials were provided by Army G4 Field Services personnel. Mortuary Affairs personnel trained in the BioSealB sealing process performed that function and advised the testing staff on the use of the other materials. The system components were tested individually and together where feasible. The primary test parameter was exposure to pressure differentials as would be experienced in flight, as well as rapid decompression at cruise altitude. Materials were sealed at ambient altitude, which was about 400 feet above sea level. Because gases expand as altitude increases, the amount of force a material is required to withstand depends in large measure on the amount of gas sealed within the component. We attempted to approximate sealing human remains as much as possible by using water filled balloons, but no attempt was made to quantifL the starting gas volume sealed within a component.
We used two methods for assessing leaks across the components. A very sensitive method was developed using Xenon '" . As testing progressed, however, it became apparent that most leaks were readily apparent by either collapse of the bag or an easily observable failure of the material being tested. The Xenon method was not used in every test. 
General Procedures
Each container will be initiallj , I tested separately. If no leaks are detected then the whole system will be tested together, including the Hardening Compound and Active Powder. Each component will be subjected to heat, vibration, and pressure stresses as described below. A test will be considered success~l if no leak of the test gas is detected.
a. BioSealB Containment System Test Protocol
1. After insertion of a specified amount of test gas, the three (3) open sides of a BioSealB Containment System will be sealed with a Heat-Sealer set to a temperature of approximately 350 degrees Fahrenheit to hermetically seal the bag. The Heat Sealer will be moved across the BioSealB material at approximately one (1) inch per second, with approximately 25 to 28 pounds of pressure exerted on the handle of the Heat-Sealer; about the amount of pressure used when shaking hands, to effectively seal the material. Two (2) seals will be created around each of the open sides approximately one (1) inch apart. The second seal is added as a safety measure to ensure the integrity of the containment system in case the first seal leaks.
2. The BioSealB Containment System will then be subjected to the chamber flight plan (see Appendix A).
3. The BioSealB bag will be checked for leaks using the method described in Appendix B.
b. Zieele* Case Test Protocol 1. The test gas will be injected into a Z i e g l d case and the lid screwed tightly into place, hermetically sealing the Z i e g l d case.
2. The Z i e g l d case will be subjected to the flight plan (see Appendix A).
3. The case will be checked for leaks using the method described in Appendix B.
c. BatesvilleO Casket Test Protocol
1. The test gas will be injected into a Batesvill& casket. The lid of the casket will be closed, locked, and tightened to hermetically seal it.
2. The Batesvilla casket will be subjected to the chamber flight plan (see Appendix A).
3. The casket will be checked for leaks using the method described in Appendix B.
d. Drop Protocol
1. After successful completion of a total containment system has been accomplished, a Z i e g l d system (sealed BioSeal@ bag inside a sealed Z i e g l d case inside a sealed Batewill& casket) will be raised to a height of 4 feet and dropped onto a cement surface. This action is designed to simulate the unlikely event of a forklift dropping the system during movement on a ship or into an aircraft and control being lost.
2.
The casket will then be tested in the altitude chamber as described in Appendix A.
General Test Procedures:
a. At the end of each testing cycle, each piece of equipment tested will be graded as "leak detected" or "no leak detected'?.
b. Between tests the altitude chamber must be vented to purge it of any potential test gas residuals to prevent the leak sensors on the follow-on Test Protocols fiom registering positive fiom residual gas fumes. In the event that a leak is detected, an attempt will be made to identify the component that failed.
c. Records will be kept of each phase of the tests. 1) Ascent from ground level to 8,000 feet at 1,000 feethinute 2) Maintain 8,000 feet altitude for one hour 3) At one-hour point, conduct rapid decompression from 8,000 to 37,000 feet (decompression rate will be approximately 1 0 seconds) 4) Maintain 37,000 feet for one minute (longer if AFIERA needs more time to complete a leak test) 5) After one minute at peak altitude, descend to 10,000 feet at 10,000 fVminute 6) At 10,000 feet, slow descent rate to 2,000 Wrnin, stopping the descent at 4,000 feet 7) Maintain 4,000 feet for 30 minutes 8) Descend to ground level at 2,000 fVmin e. Leak checks will follow the procedures in Appendix B or C. f. After completion of the altitude tests, the manikin (if used) will be removed from the container. Each BioSeala System will be used only once and will not be used for a second test of any kind; the Zieglm case and casket may be re-used. g. For testing the Z i e g l d case and the casket, a port may be installed that can be used to introduce the test gas to a pressure that will result in a pressure differential to simulate the flight profile up 45,000 feet. This will allow the leak testing to occur outside the chamber at ground level.
h. Several smaller BioSeal@ bags ("pillows") will be tested within the chamber under different conditions. For example, intentionally leaving a small gap in the thermal seal process, placing a human hair across the area to be sealed, placing a small amount of dirt across the area to be sealed, taking the sealed bag to the max altitude to test bursting thresholds, etc. 1) The thermal conductivity helium-sensing unit will be turned on at least 5 minutes prior to the start of the experiment and will be considered ready when the zero alignment is stable.
2) The probe line of the thermal conductivity helium-sensing unit will have been previously sealed in a penetration into the chamber.
3) Upon placing the dual bag system (described below) into the chamber the probe end will be placed partially through the opening of the second bag.
b. Bag preparation 1) All but one inch of the BioSeal@ bag will be sealed.
2) The bag will then be flushed with helium.
3) The final sealing will then be accomplished. 4) A second bag, slightly larger than the first, will then be placed around the first bag leaving an approximately 1 inch opening in the seam.
5) The bag unit will then be subjected to the exposures as per Appendix A. (See also a.3. above) 2. Human Remains Pouch and Ziegle* Case a. A hermetically sealed valve and pressure gauge unit will be attached to the Z i e g l d case holding the Human Remains Pouch (HRP) with Biosealed simulated remains.
b. Initially, the units will be flushed with helium and then sealed according to the manufacturer's usual specifications.
c. Helium will then be introduced into the chamber until the pressure differential is equal to the test altitudes.
d. The probe of the leak detector (after having stabilized the zero setting) will be hand drawn across the baglcasket seals to initially determine if there are any leaks. e. Flight simulation will then be conducted according to Appendix A. f. At the end of the test the probe will again be hand drawn across the HRP/Ziegler@ case seals to determine if any leaks can be detected. This can be accomplished at intervals during the test as well if necessary. After the pressure returns to baseline, the container will be opened with the probe near the opening to verify the sensor's ability to detect helium.
Atmendix C: Leak Testing Protocol:
1. The container being tested is injected with (~e -'~~) .
~t 3 -l~~ is a radioactive noble gas that will rapidly become uniformly distributed throughout the space in the container. A high-purity germanium detector (HpGe) will be used to effect measurements of the gamma spectrum (principally the 0.081 MeV photon with an intensity of 38%).
2. Before commencing with each respective test phase, an initial measurement of the container is made to determine optimum measurement distance and establish the baseline or reference activity before commencing with the test phase. The container is then released to the chamber investigators for completion of the individual test phase (i.e. vibration, thermal, or pressure differential).
3. At the conclusion of the testing phase, the HpGe detector is used to measure the ~e -"~ remaining in the tested container. If the xe-13) measured value remains constant across a series of tests, the test did not result in a breach in container integrity. Reduction of the post-test measurement ~e -"~ relative to the initial measurement indicates that the container developed a leak during the test.
DISCUSSION
In this abbreviated testing session, the BioSealB material held up quite well, although the protocol was not designed to thoroughly test the material. We attempted to conduct some tests with what we thought might be reasonable contaminants across the seal surfaces. These contaminants appeared to affect the ability of a sealed bag to withstand pressure changes, but a definitive judgment on this topic is not possible fkom this limited testing.
Even in the hands of experienced operators, the sealing process appeared problematic. The heated sealing mechanism sometimes slid across the material unevenly, bringing into question the integrity of the seal. We attempted to overheat the seals of a small pouch by intentionally leaving the sealing mechanism in place too long. This pouch survived a very high altitude exposure.
The construction of the Zieglea case did not allow a "hermetic" seal. We attempted to assess the ability of the case to withstand pressure differentials by drilling a hole in the side, then installing and then sealing a port through which a pressure transducer was placed, We could not produce any measurable pressure differential because the entire area of the lid-case interface leaked (see figure 6 ). We determined that the Ziegler@ case could not be relied upon as a "hermetic" seal.
The Batesvilla casket was designed with two access ports with screw-on seals. The manufacturer's instructions direct that these ports are to be opened during flight in order to avoid failure of a casket exposed to pressure differentials of flight. We tested this by sealing a casket, taking it relatively slowly to 47,000 feet, then returning it relatively quickly to ground level. The casket was able to maintain only a very small pressure gradient during ascent, and when the altitude was maintained this gradient slowly approached zero, indicating that the casket was unable to maintain a "hermetic" seal when exposed to pressure changes. Upon descent, the casket imploded as predicted by the manufacturer.
We did not test the ability of 3 BioSealB bags together to hold a seal, since that was not the procedure established by Mortuary Affairs and we felt that the width of the BioSealB material would make 3 consecutive seals functionally impossible to achieve. We were not able to comment on whether the proposed triple containment system would be an effective method for surface transport by ship. Ships have their own vibration and other environmental considerations and we are not equipped for the appropriate tests.
CONCLUSION
It can confidently be said, that the proposed triple containment system would not provide the triple containment required by the CDC, and that the system would not provide adequate protection for transport aircraft aircrew or passengers.
RECOMMENDATION
The proposed triple containment system should not be used for air transport of biologically contaminated human remains. 
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